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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method to distribute secret key among sender and
receiver by the transmission of quantum particles (e.g. photons). Device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (DIQKD) is a version of quantum key distribution with a stronger
security demand in that sender and receiver do not need to rely on the inner workings of
their device, which consequently can come from an untrusted vendor. We study the rate
at which DIQKD can be carried out for a given quantum channel connecting sender and
receiver and provide a technique to upper bound the achievable rate. As a result, we show
that the rate of device independent secure key can for some channels be much smaller (even
arbitrarily so) than that of QKD. We do so, by first providing definition of device indepen-
dent secure key rate, which is of independent interest. For bipartite states we formulate a
sufficient condition for a gap between QKD and DIQKD key rates and examples of 8-qubit
bipartite state exhibiting the gap between device dependent and device independent key.
Ever since the invention of the BB84 pro-
tocol [1], the strength point of quantum key
distribution (QKD) has been its ability to pro-
vide information-theoretically secure key dis-
tribution [2]. However it is practically diffi-
cult to guarantee that the protocols are imple-
mented correctly without introducing any side
channel [3]. These side channels are usually
present in the quantum part of the implementa-
tion, therefore there is a lot of interest in using
quantum-device-independent QKD, or simply
device-independent QKD (DIQKD), which re-
quires the protocols to guarantee security based
only on the statistics of the classical values
generated by the protocol [4--9]. By construc-
tion then such protocols will be secure also
against any side channel that could be present
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in the quantum devicesRecent results have fi-
nally been able to prove the security of a (class)
of device-independent QKD protocols against
general adversaries, while still achieving rates
comparable to standard QKD [9], which we
will call henceforth device-dependent QKD. Al-
though the accuracy of devices that can al-
low for implementation of current protocols
needs to be increased [10], as a building block,
the proof of principle experiment exhibiting a
loophole-free violation of the CHSH inequality
has been already demonstrated [11--13].
Every DIQKD protocol P , in the ideal case
of no external influence, is a classical post-
processing procedure run on some honest de-
vice consisting of a pair of a quantum state and
set of measurements (M, ρ). The honest device
is such that given no attack, namely if the mea-
surements from M are indeed performed on
(many copies of) ρ, the test designed as a part of
the protocol P will be passed with high proba-
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2bility and subsequently, the processing done by
P on the obtained data will result in maximal
key length. The length per device use is called
the key rate of the protocol P . For the practical
protocols known so far (see [14] and references
therein), the honest state ρ is in general a max-
imally entangled state mixed with a maximally
mixed state. The measurements fromM corre-
spond to some Bell inequality [15--17], that is
maximally violated on state ρ whenever the lat-
ter state is close to ρ.
An important benchmark of the device
(M, ρ) then becomes how much quantum
device-independent key rate one can gain from
it if we had the best protocol. The device may
be honest, and then one asks for the maximal
possible device-independent key rate that the
provider of the device can deliver, maximizing
over protocols. On the other hand (M, ρ) can be
initially honest, but later changed due to some
external factor. In fact this is what the honest
parties are interested in: how much key will
they gain under certain realistic circumstances,
e.g. noise in the communication channel used
by the device that can change the state ρ dis-
tributed between the honest parties into some
other state σ? Similarly, the honest measure-
ment M can drift to some other measurement
N due to systematic error, hacking, etc.
In this manuscript we pose and study a
stronger problem, namely how much quantum
device-independent key rate KDID (ρ) can the
honest parties achieve from the state ρ, opti-
mized also over the choice of measurementsM,
on top of the choice of protocols P . This is a
question that a provider of DIQKD devices can
ask aiming at delivering the best device that
can work under circumstances that would al-
low only for access to the state ρ.
We present fundamental limitations in the
form of non-trivial upper bounds on KDID . A
trivial upper bound is the so called device-
dependent distillable key KD, for which there
exist different equivalent definitions [18--21].
This is the amount of key rate secure against
quantum adversary that one can obtain from
independent copies of a state ρ using trusted
quantum local operations and classical commu-
nication (LOCC). Since such protocols are not
limited to measure ρ by some POVM M, as it
is the case for device-independent ones, the in-
equality KDID ≤ KD is clear. Moreover due
to quantum de Finetti techniques [20, 22], in
the device-dependent scenario one can perform
some tests in the protocol that uniquely iden-
tify the underlying state and guarantee that it
is close to the expected form ρ⊗n, so that even
without trusting the source of states one can
achieve the key rate KD(ρ). Such a strong guar-
antee on the underlying measurement and state
of the device is impossible to achieve in the
device-independent setting, because there exist
infinite different measurements and states that
lead to the same device, thus opening a way to
new upper bounds that are true in the device-
dependent case.
An important result was the discovery
that bound-entangled states states, and thus
states positive under partial transposition (PPT
states), for which the distillation of pure entan-
glement at non-zero rate is impossible [23], can
produce key at non-zero rate [18, 19]. It was
shown there, that some PPT states can approxi-
mate states with perfect key arbitrarily well, but
also fall arbitrarily close to separable states after
partial transposition. An analogous result for
channels was shown in [24--26].
As the main result, we show that for PPT
states ρ
KDID (ρ) ≤ min{KD(ρΓ),KD(ρ)} (1)
where ρΓ is the partial transpose of state ρ. The
PPT states that show a gap between distillable
entanglement and distillable key thus also be-
come examples of states for which KD(ρ) is
large while KDID (ρΓ) is small. This implies, that
there are PPT states ρ which in spite of hav-
ing positive quantum device-dependent key,
cannot serve to produce key for any quantum
device-independent protocol with the same rate.
This proves a fundamental gap between quan-
tum device-independent and quantum device-
dependent secure key distribution. More pre-
cisely, using more computable upper bounds
on KD such as the relative entropy of entangle-
ment Er [19, 27], we obtain the extreme exam-
ples of states ρd of increasing dimension d for
3which
0←d→∞ KDID (ρd) KD(ρd)→d→∞ 1 (2)
We further provide a sufficient condition for a
class of states to exhibit the gap between keys,
and based on states given in [28] we explicitly
construct an 8-qubit bipartite state (of 16 ⊗ 16
dimension) with KD ≥ 0.925284 and KDID ≤
0.00396825.
Note that narrowing the question to PPT
states is well posed, as some of them display
a Bell violation [29]. The problem of to what
extent one can violate a Bell inequality on PPT
states or almost bound-entangled states with
key has been first studied in [30]. There, us-
ing techniques from [31] based on the impossi-
bility of swapping some states of key across a
repeater, it was argued that if a state is hardly
distinguishable by Local Operations and Clas-
sical Communication (LOCC) from a separable
state (which admits a locally-realistic model),
then it cannot violate to high extent any Bell
inequality with sufficiently small number of in-
puts and/or outputs. In [30] the problem of the
rate of violation on asymptotically many copies
of the state was also studied, and again via sim-
ilar techniques to [31], proved that for some
state it is small. However it was left as an open
problem, studied here, the relation between low
rate of non-locality and the amount of distill-
able device-independent key.
As our second main contribution, we work
out analogous results for quantum channels. In
this case the device is a tuple (M, ρ,Λ). The
state ρ is a bipartite state of Alice and the
part that is an input to the channel Λ, and M
is a product measurement performed at Alice
and Bob after the use of the channel Λ. We
then define the device-independent private capac-
ity of Λ and provide an upper bound on it
in form of device dependent measures of the
channel Λ composed with partial transposition
map. There are known channels for which the
device-dependent private capacity when com-
posed with the transpose becomes negligible.
This implies that these channels also have negli-
gible device-independent private capacity. The
lowest-dimensional such channel has 4-qbit in-
put [32].
Our approach differs from [33], where key
from statistical distributions is considered. Re-
cently, upper bounds showing difference be-
tween one-way and two-way quantum device-
independent key has been shown in [34] for the
case of particular protocol, based on the CHSH
inequality. In approach presented here, the
bounds are valid for two-way key distillation
protocol, any Bell inequality, given known state
of the honest implementation that has positive
partial transposition.
I. MAIN RESULTS
In order to provide with aforementioned
examples, we define the device-independent
relative entropy of entanglement as an upper
bound on the device-independent distillable
key, and use it to show that a known family
of states, for which the device-dependent dis-
tillable key stays constant, has asymptoticaly
zero device-independent distillable key. The
key ingredient is a symmetry, the invariance
under partial transposition, coming from the
locality of the measurements and the device-
independence. Our approach is general, so
that in particular we obtain upper bounds in
terms of both device-independent squashed
entanglement and device-independent relative
entropy of entanglement. This is important,
because squashed entanglement and relative
of entanglement are incomparable entangle-
ment measures. For example, for some states
the squashed entanglement is a tighter upper
bound on distillable key than the relative en-
tropy of entanglement [31].
The bipartite local measurementM of a de-
vice is a collection of POVMs for Alice and
POVMs for Bob. Collectively they are indexed
by a pair of finite inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y (one for
Alice and one for Bob). Let (a, b) ∈ A × B be
their output sets. Without loss of generality we
can assume that these sets are the same every
time the device is used. We can then identify
the device measurement just by its POVM ele-
ments as
M = {Mxa ⊗ M˜yb }a,b,x,y (3)
4Together with a quantum state ρ,M defines
the device (M, ρ), namely the conditional prob-
ability distribution
p(ab|xy) = tr
[
ρ ·Mxa ⊗ M˜yb
]
.
With the definition of device in place, we
can define the device-independent distillable
key K˜DID (ρ) of a quantum state ρ. Informally,
K˜DID (ρ) it is a supremum over the finite key
rates κ achieved by all possible measurements
M and all possible protocols P with (M, ρ) as
the honest implementation of the device.
The finite key rate of a fixed protocol hides
an infimum over all possible real implementa-
tions (N , σ) of the device (M, ρ), namely over
all the real devices that pass the same test in the
protocol and thus are compatible with the hon-
est device. For this it is sufficient that the condi-
tional probability distributions of the device are
close for any input, a condition that we denote
with
(M, ρ) ≈ (N , σ).
Similarly we use equality (M, ρ) ∧= (N , σ),
when the conditional probability distributions
are the same. Finally, as for any definition of
a rate, the definition of K˜DID also contains the
asymptotic limits of block length and error pa-
rameters. This process is sufficiently general to
include the recently proposed protocols of [9]
and realistic future protocols. However, for our
purpose of upper bounding K˜DID , such a defi-
nition is exceedingly cumbersome. To simplify
the treatement, we define, as a relaxation, the
device-independent distillable key KDID , where
the knowledge of the adversary is restricted to
i.i.d. (or simply iid) attacks, and prove upper
bounds on this new measure without loss of
generality. We emphasize that
KDID ≥ K˜DID . (4)
Although there is no correspondent of the quan-
tum de Finetti theorem for device-independent
QKD [14], and thus we cannot prove the equiv-
alence the these two definitions as it has been
done for the device-dependent case [35, 36],
it is demonstrated in [9] that in the case of
CHSH game general attacks including memory
are as powerful as the i.i.d. attacks, correspond-
ing to the so-called collective attack in the case
of device-dependent quantum key distribution.
There are thus indications that KDID and K˜
DI
D
might not be so different.
Before we study these problems, we shall
comment on certain intuitions that are immedi-
ate from present literature on DIQKD. It is obvi-
ous that for anyM there exist states (separable
ones) σ for which K˜DID (M, σ) is zero. This is
because also device dependent key KD is zero
for separable states [19, 37], while clearly the lat-
ter upper bounds the former. It is also plausi-
ble that conversely, for a given state ρ different
choices of measurement settingsM can lead to
different values of rates of certain protocols (See
how the values of CHSH inequality [16] and
Chained Bell inequality [38] differ for a proto-
col proposed in [39]). However, it is expected
that for general pure state there is no gap be-
tween KD and K˜DID , i.e. there exist protocols in
DIQKD that perform as good as in the device-
dependent case, with key rate achieving KD.
This is because of the fact, that pure states are
self-testable [40], i.e. identifiable up to irrele-
vant factors via statistics drawn from certain set-
tingsM.
More precisely, we prove in Theorem 1 that
KDID (ρ) ≤ K↓D(ρ):= supM inf(N ,σ)=(M,ρ)
KD(σ). (5)
Thus by a similarly adapted version, we ob-
tain upper bounds for any known entangle-
ment measure that upper bounds on the device-
dependent distillable key. Namely, we can gen-
erally define for any entanglement measure E
the following device-independent version
E↓(ρ):= sup
M
inf
(N ,σ)=(M,ρ)
E(σ) ≤ E(ρ), (6)
and if E is either the distillable key KD or an
upper bound on it, then it follows that
K˜DID ≤ KDID ≤ K↓D ≤ E↓ ≤ E. (7)
In particular for E being the squashed entangle-
ment Esq [41] and the relative entropy of entan-
glement Er [42] we obtain
K˜DID ≤ E↓sq, E↓r . (8)
5As already mentioned, all pure states are self
testable, meaning that for any pure state there
exist a measurement such that any device that
has equal statistic produces a locally equiva-
lent state. As such E↓(ρ) = E(ρ) for all pure
states and any entanglement measure. During
the completion of this work we learned that E↓
has been defined independently in [43], where
they only compute lower bounds on this quan-
tity; no lower bound on the operational defini-
tion of device-independent key was given.
The key ingredient for the gap is then the ob-
servation that, if ρ is PPT, namely if its partial
transpose is positive ρΓ = id ⊗ T (ρ) ≥ 0 and
thus a valid state, then we have
(MΓ, ρΓ) = (M, ρ) (9)
where MΓ is intended as the device measure-
ment obtained by applying the partial transpo-
sition to each measurement operator, which re-
turns a valid local measurements due to all op-
erators being product. It thus follows immedi-
ately that
KDID (ρ) ≤ supM E(ρ
Γ) = E(ρΓ). (10)
and thus
K˜DID (ρ) ≤ Esq(ρΓ), Er(ρΓ). (11)
Our result then follows immediately for all
those examples of PPT states that are close to
private bits, but that after partial transposition
become close to separable states [19, 28, 30, 31,
44]. We specifically choose relative entropy of
entanglement Er as an upper bound of distil-
lable key [42], and estimate it for the partial
transpose of some of these examples to prove
that there exist families of states of increasing
dimension for which the upper bound of Equa-
tion (10) approaches zero, in spite of the fact
that KD is lower bounded by a constant. Thus
there exist quantum states with positive device-
dependent key rate, for which there does not
exist any Bell inequality with finite number of
measurements and outputs, that can certify a
non-negligible amount of device-independent
key.
II. PROOF OVERVIEW
The idea of the proof of the bound from
Equation (7) is the following. We first find
the most simple definition for the device-
independent key KDID of a bipartite state ρ, ob-
tained by enlarging the power of the honest par-
ties, while restricting the power of the adver-
sary. This gives an upper bound on the realis-
tic rates, and it is sufficient for our purposes,
since any upper bound on the simplified rate
KDID (ρ) will be an upper bound on any realistic
rate. Here, we focus directly on the simplified
rate KDID [9, 14]. Our definition lets Alice and
Bob to optimize over the measurementM used
to get the statistics on the given state ρ. The
resulting device-independent key is the worst
device-dependent i.i.d. key rate of devices com-
patible with (M, ρ).
In our approach we mimic the definition
of device-dependent distillable key, which we
thus recall here to be defined as [19, 31, 44]
KD(ρ):= inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
sup
Π
κεn(Π, ρ) (12)
= inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
κεn(ρ) (13)
where lim ≡ lim sup, κεn(Π, ρ) is the ε-perfect
key rate of the state obtained as the output of
protocol Π acting on n identical copies of the
state ρ, and where we use κεn(σ):= supΠ κεn(Π, σ)
to denote the supremum achieved by all proto-
cols for a given security parameter ε and block-
length n. Here and below, we leave the proto-
cols Π implicit because we can black-box our ar-
gument around it.
Our definition of device-independent distill-
able key follows the same lines:
KDID (M, ρ):= inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
κDI,εn (M, ρ) (14)
where
κDI,εn (M, ρ):= sup
Π′
inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
κεn(Π′, (N , σ))
(15)
is the maximal keyrate achieved for any se-
curity parameter ε, blocklength or number of
copies n, and measurement M chosen by Al-
ice and Bob, and where κεn(Π, (N , σ)) is the
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FIG. 1: The space of classical protocols are all the
(classical) local operations with public communication
(LOPC). A protocol will use LOPC to generate the
input to the device and process the output. A device-
dependent distillation protocol in constrast uses quan-
tum local operations and public communication. The
composition of a device-independent classical LOPC
protocol and the device measurement is an quantum
LOPC protocol acting on the quantum state (here we
ignored the blocklength parameter n). The assump-
tion of the measurement device performing a product
measurement must be physically imposed, usually by
imposing that the input-output delay is shorter than
light-speed travel between the devices.
amount of ε-perfect key rate of the state ob-
tained as the output of protocol Π′ acting on
n identical copies of the device (N , σ). This is
the largest reasonable operational definition of
device-independent key; it contains all possible
simplifications while still allowing to obtain a
meaningful result and being operationally justi-
fied. For example, if we include the explicit test-
ing rounds, allow for only an approximation
of the device, allow for a non i.i.d. implemen-
tation, and so on, then the resulting finite rate
cannot be higher. At the same time the order of
the optimizations are fixed by their operational
meaning. Equation (14) and the supremum in
Equation (15) represent the public choices made
by Alice and Bob, while the infimum in Equa-
tion (15) represents the choice of the attacker.
The order of the optimization is given by de-
pendence for Alice and Bob, while for the at-
tacker is given by the assumption that he holds
all the public knowledge. Had we placed the in-
fimum over devices outside the other optimiza-
tions, then this would describe an attacker with-
out the knowledge of the public choices placed
inside. This is indeed what we will do next,
move the attackers optimization outside, sim-
plifying the expressions to get computable up-
per bounds.
By simple min-max inequality we can swap
the order of the optimization to get an up-
per bound, and by then relaxing to all device-
dependent protocols we have
κDI,εn (M, ρ)
:= sup
Π′
inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
κεn(Π′, (N , σ)) (16)
≤ inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
sup
Π′
κεn(Π′, (N , σ))
≤ inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
sup
Π
κεn(Π, σ) (17)
= inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
κεn(σ) (18)
where the rates in Equations (17) and (18)
are the same rates introduced in Equations (12)
and (13). The relaxation of the protocols in
Equation (17) is clear and displayed in Fig-
ure 1; the measurement N acts like a fixed pre-
processing on the state, and thus for any proto-
col Π acting on the devices, the composition of
Π with the n measurements N is just a partic-
ular protocol acting on n-copies of the state σ.
Removing this constraint can only increase the
rate. We thus have
KDID (M, ρ) ≤ inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
κεn(σ) (19)
Using Equation (19) as our simplest starting
point we find.
Theorem 1.
KDI(M, ρ) ≤ inf
(N,σ)∧=(M,ρ)
KD(σ)
Proof. First notice that the min-max inequality
is valid also as a inf-limsup inequality. Namely
for any sequence of functions fn(x), we have
lim
n→∞
inf
x
fn(x) ≤ inf
x
lim
n→∞
fn(x) (20)
since we can rewrite the limit superior using in-
fimum and supremum, and then use max-min
inequality followed by the commutation of two
infima:
lim
n→∞
inf
x
fn(x) = inf
n≥0
sup
m≥n
inf
x
fn(x)
≤ inf
n≥0
inf
x
sup
m≥n
fn(x)
= inf
x
lim
n→∞
fn(x).
7Λ Λ Λ
FIG. 2: A general LOCC protocol for channel Λ. At
the beginning and after each channel use, Alice and
Bob are allowed to perform an LOCC operation to
prepare the input to the next channel use.
We use Equation (19) as our starting point
and use Equation (20)
KDI(M, ρ) ≤ inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
κεn(σ) (21)
≤ inf
ε>0
inf
(N ,σ)≈ε(M,ρ)
lim
n→∞
κεn(σ). (22)
independently we can always restrict the infi-
mum to devices that are exactly equal to the
original box, this only reduces the set of devices
and increases the infimum
KDI(M, ρ) ≤ inf
ε>0
inf
(N ,σ)∧=(M,ρ)
lim
n→∞
κεn(σ). (23)
Since the infimum over devices is now indepen-
dent of the security parameter, we can now sim-
ply commute the two infima
KDI(M, ρ) ≤ inf
(N ,σ)∧=(M,ρ)
inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
κεn(σ) (24)
= inf
(N ,σ)∧=(M,ρ)
KD(σ) (25)
reaching the claim.
III. CHANNEL PRIVATE CAPACITY
The same idea also works for private, or se-
cret, capacity P(Λ) of a channel Λ, and thus
for the most general setting for QKD which in-
cludes modelling, for example, the optical fiber
itself instead of the states produced across the
fiber. A general protocol around n iid copies of
Λ is displayed in Figure 2.
In the channel setting, given a channel Λ
from Alice to Bob, we define an honest device
for Λ as a tuple (M, ρ,Λ), where ρ is a bipar-
tite state of Alice and the input to the channel,
and M is a device measurement of Alice and
Bob (the output of the channel). The conditional
probability distribution is then obtained via
p(ab|xy) = tr
[
(id⊗ Λ)(ρ) ·Mxa ⊗ M˜yb
]
,
and we have the same definitions of equality
and distance for two devices.
Again, there are multiple choices for the def-
inition of device-independent private capacity,
depending on the allowed adversaries. The
device-dependent private capacity is of the
form
P(Λ):= inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
piεn(Λ), (26)
where piεn(Λ) is the largest ε-perfect key rate ob-
tained by the best privacy protocol that uses
n identical copies of Λ. The private capac-
ity itself has different version, namely the two-
way (P2), one-way (P1), or direct (P0) pri-
vate capacities depending on whether two-way
(LOCC2) or one-way classical communication
(LOCC1), or only local operations (LOCC0 =
LO) is allowed in the privacy protocol (practical
protocols might still need communication for
practical purposes, like testing, outside/around
the privacy protocol). With increasing power
comes increasing rates and thus P0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2.
To define the device-independent private capac-
ity we want to change piεn, like for the state sce-
nario, and define
PDI(M, ρ,Λ):= inf
ε>0
lim
n→∞
piDI,εn (M, ρ,Λ), (27)
where piDI,εn will be the largest key rate opti-
mized over privacy protocols, this time also in-
cluding a minimization over the possible de-
vices that are compatible with the honest device.
Just like in the state setting, on top of different
powers of the honest parties generating differ-
ent definitions for piDI,εn , additional diversity is
introduced considering different powers of the
adversary, namely different classes of devices
to compare against the honest device.
Remark 1. We can envision a fully general class
as in Figure 5, the class of devices where the
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FIG. 3: IDI0 devices, the strongest restriction of the
devices of the adversary in the case of channel-based
device-independent QKD. No communication between
the two sides of the device is allowed aside from an iid
channel Λ. The same iid state is given as input and
the same iid local measurement is used to produce the
data. A protocol around this device is a particular
LOCC protocol around Λ⊗n.
The second instance shows how the transposition map,
for which ϑ2 = id, is inserted to generate an equivalent
device. One ϑ is absorbed into the measurement
leaving Λ ◦ ϑ whenever this is a channel.
channel is iid but the state is generated adap-
tively with two way communication, the class
of devices where the channel is iid and the in-
put state is a global fixed state as in Figure 7, or
the class of fully iid devices where the channel,
state and measurement are iid as in Figure 3.
Again, the upper bounds that we are inter-
ested in are upper bounds for all these capac-
ities, and thus, for simplicity, it will suffice to
focus on just the iid devices of Figure 3 with iid
channels, states and measurements.
We denote with DI0, DI1 and DI2 the de-
vices where the channel is iid, memory is al-
lowed, and that can respectively use none, one-
way or two-way classical communication be-
tween the input-output rounds. Notice, that
this communication does not happen between
the time Alice and Bob give their inputs and
receive their outputs (which would not allow
for device independence), but either before the
input is given or after the output is received.
The devices can still share memory locally at
Alice and Bob across each round, and thus we
can further restrict the adversary as mentioned
above and define the (iid-device independent)
variants IDI0, IDI1 and IDI2, where the whole
devices are iid and are not allowed memory or
communication from one round to the next. No-
tice that the iid assumption in the case of chan-
nels is much stronger and unnatural than for
the state case, because even if the channel itself
in the device is iid, the device might be not-iid
because of the input state; in general even Alice
and Bob need to use entangled input states to
achieve any capacity. Therefore our use of IDI0
devices is purely technical. Each choice defines
a private capacity PDIji or P
IDIj
i for i, j = 0, 1, 2,
which is upper bounded by a device-dependent
capacity as a consequence of defining an upper
bounding the corresponding finite rates as fol-
lows. Each choice of i and j defines the key
rates rates pi
DIj ,ε
i,n and pi
DIj ,ε
i,n , both bounded by a
device-dependent key rate by making protocol,
together with the state and measurement of the
device, a specific device-dependent protocol:
pi
DIj ,ε
i,n (M, ρ,Λ)
≤ piIDIj ,εi,n (M, ρ,Λ) (28)
:= sup
Π∈LOCCi
inf
(N ,σ,Λ′)≈ε(M,ρ,Λ)
(N ,σ,Λ′)∈IDIj
κεn(Π, (N , σ,Λ′))
(29)
≤ inf
(N ,σ,Λ′)≈ε(M,ρ,Λ)
(N ,σ,Λ′)∈IDIj
piεmax{i,j},n(Λ′) (30)
≤ inf
(N ,σ,Λ′)≈ε(M,ρ,Λ)
(N ,σ,Λ′)∈IDI0
piε2,n(Λ′) (31)
where κεn is the rate of achieved ε-perfect key,
while piε`,n is the rate already optimized over `-
way protocols acting on n copies of Λ′.
The largest of these capacities is PIDI02 , since
iid devices, larger i, and smaller j make for
larger rates. Private capacities with j < i
are arguably less meaningful, because it allows
less classical communication between the de-
vices than it is allowed for Alice and Bob. We
can then define different variants of the DI ver-
sion of an entanglement measure (for channels),
namely for a measureE(Λ) we can define differ-
ent device-independent optimizations E↓0 , E↓1
and E↓2 depending on the communication al-
lowed in the device. Since, as an argument to
the entanglement measure, we are concerned
with only one copy of the channel, the devices
in the optimization in E↓i are iid devices.
Taking the rate limits and with the same ar-
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FIG. 4: Relationship between the device-independent
channel capacities.
guments as Theorem 1 we thus have
PDIji (M, ρ,Λ) ≤ inf
(N ,σ,Λ′)∧=(M,ρ,Λ)
(N ,σ,Λ′)∈IDIj
Pmax{i,j}(Λ′).
(32)
and in particular, with `:= max{i, j},
PDIji (Λ):= supM,ρP
DIj
i (M, ρ,Λ) (33)
≤ P↓j` (Λ):= supM,ρ inf(N ,σ,Λ′)∧=(M,ρ,Λ)
(N ,σ,Λ′)∈IDIj
P`(Λ′) (34)
≤ P↓02 (Λ) (35)
Remark. Notice how we did not prove that
PDIji ≤ P↓
j
i , the crucial step being Equation (30).
Take the example of i = 1, Alice and Bob are al-
lowed only one-way communication, and j =
2, the devices could use two-way communica-
tion. The possibility of PDI21 > P↓
2
1 means that
the added power of two-way communication,
could allow the device to switch to a channel
Λ′ with very bad one-way private capacity, e.g.
P1(Λ′) = 0, however to mimic the statistics of
the original channel, some key needs to be ex-
tracted using the two-way communication, and
this could still be a better attack than simply
finding the worst replacement using only one-
way communication.
We can finally make the same use of the par-
tial transpose map, which we denote with ϑ
(ϑ(ρ) = ρT ). If a channel Λ is such that Λ ◦ ϑ
is also a channel, then any device for Λ can be
transformed into a device for Λ ◦ ϑ with the ex-
act same statistics; the case of IDI0 is shown in
x1 a1 x2 a2 xn an
σ
y1 b1 y2 b2 yn bn
FIG. 5: The most general way an adversary could
implement any device in device-independent QKD,
whether the honest implementation is iid, state based,
channel based, or neither. Single lines are quantum
systems, double line are classical systems, and xi, yi
are the inputs and ai, bi the outputs of the device.
This is almost the most general case allowed by the
entropy accumulation protocol; indeed, joining such a
device with inputs generated by a markov chain and
copying the inputs as additional outputs produces
and entropy accumulation channel [9]. There thus
exist tests that passing them restricts the adversary
enough to generate device-independent key at non-
zero asymptotic rate. Restricting the structure of the
real devices can only increase the rates.
x1 N
a1 x2 N
a2 xn N
an
σ σ σ
N N Ny1 b1 y2 b2 yn bn
FIG. 6: The strongest restriction on the devices of
the adversary from Figure 5 in the case of state-based
device-independent QKD. Each round is an iid copy
of the same measurement N on the same state σ.
A protocol around this device is a particular LOCC
protocol on σ⊗n.
Figure 3. The consequence is the analogous of
Equation (10):
PDIji (Λ) ≤ Pmax{i,j}(Λ ◦ ϑ) ≤ P2(Λ ◦ ϑ). (36)
It should now be clear that the reason why
for our purpose it is enough to consider fully
iid devices is because the transposition map it-
self is iid, meaning that the n-fold transposi-
tion is tensor product of single channel trans-
positions. Again, there already exist examples
of such channels for which P1(Λ) is large, but
P2(Λ ◦ ϑ) is small [45].
10
x1 a1 x2 a2
Λ′ Λ′
y1 b1 y2 b2
FIG. 7: Restriction of the devices of the adversary in
the case of channel-based device-independent QKD.
No communication between the two sides of the device
is allowed aside from an iid channel Λ′. Here, the
input state is generated at each round from a quantum
memory, while in the main text we also restrict to
single-copy iid states. Both lead to the same bound,
but this one is easier to display. A protocol around
this device is still a particular LOCC protocol around
Λ′⊗n.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have derived a general bound on quan-
tum device-independent key. To this end, we
have provided both theoretic and realistic defi-
nition of the latter, as the supremum over the
most general class of protocols [9, 10], which
is of independent interest. Using the bound
we have shown that there is a gap between
the amount of device-dependent and device-
independent key which can be obtained from
some states with positive partial transposition.
Such states can not then serve as a base for the
honest implementation of any DIQKD protocol
with non-negligible key rate.
Notice that the technique with the transpo-
sition map has led to upper bounds on Bell
non-locality in terms of faithfull measures of
entanglement [30], taking inspiration on how
the same technique has led to upper bounds
on device-dependent repeater key rates [31].
In [46] the bounds on the device-dependent
repeater key rates where improved using ar-
guments beyond the use of the partial trans-
pose and leading to upper bounds in terms of
distillable entanglement. It is our hope that
a similar connection can be found for device-
independent distillable key and private capac-
ity, and that improved bounds on them can be
found in terms of distillable entanglement and
quantum capacity using the techniques of [46].
This can potentially lead to bound for non PPT
states and channels. The 8-qubit example is (as
for now) the smallest known state with posi-
tive partial transposition that exhibits the gap
between KDD and KDI . It is also the first exam-
ple that exhibits at the same time the same gap be-
tween KDD and repeated key, and gives hope
that the NPT states (private bits) with limited
repeater key given in [46] shares the same gap
of the keys as described here for the PPT case.
In general, the gap ∆K((ρ,M)) := KD(ρ)−
KDI((ρ,M)) is a measure of trust towards a
device (ρ,M) (analogously for quantum chan-
nels). For example, because singlet state is self-
testable, ∆K is zero for the singlet state with
CHSH testing, meaning that this device does
not need to be trusted which. However, this is
not the case for some bound entangled states for
which our results prove that ∆K is non-zero.
Note
After concluding the research on this article,
we became aware of independent but closely re-
lated work [47].
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V. EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTIONS
Form the above results, it follows, that a suf-
ficient condition for a PPT state to exhibit a gap
in device-dependent and device-independent
key it is that KD(ρ) < KD(ρΓ). We show below
a sufficient condition for a wide class of states.
Theorem 2. If ρABA′B′ ∈ PPT and has a matrix
form 
A1 0 0 C
0 B1 0 0
0 0 B2 0
C† 0 0 A2
 , (37)
such that its normalized diagonal blocks are separa-
ble states, and ||A1||1 = ||A2||1 = a and ||B1||1 =
||B2||1, then (denoting ||C|| = c) condition
H(a− c, a+ c, (1− 2a)/2, (1− 2a)/2) < 2a (38)
implies a gapKDI(ρ) < KD(ρ).
Proof. By [48], and from what is observed
in [31] we have that KD(ρ) ≥ 1 − H(a − c, a +
c, b, b). To see this we employ the well known
technique of privacy squeezeing [18]. The pri-
vacy squeezed state of ρ reads:
ρps =

||A1||1 0 0 ||C||1
0 ||B1||1 0 0
0 0 ||B2||1 0
||C†||1 0 0 ||A2||1
 , (39)
and it has at least as much distillable key ob-
tained via Devetak-Winter protocol applied to
its AB system, as ρ. To lower bound the latter,
one purifies ρps to system of Eve: |ψABE〉 and
then measures systemsAB in computational ba-
sis to obtain a classical-classical-quantum state
ρccq. Then the lower bound on the key is
KD(ρ) ≥ I(A : B)ρccq − I(A : E)ρccq . (40)
Since ρccq = (a + c)/2(P00 + P11) ⊗ e1 + (a −
c)/2(P00 + P11) ⊗ e2 + bP01 ⊗ e3 + bP10 ⊗ e4,
where Pij = |ij〉〈ij| and {ei}4i=1 form an arbi-
trary orthonormal basis. there is:
I(A : B)ρccq − I(A : E)ρccq =
2−H((a+ c)2 ,
(a+ c)
2 ,
(a− c)
2 ,
(a− c)
2 , b, b)
−(1 +H(a+ c, a− c, b, b)
−H((a+ c)2 ,
(a+ c)
2 ,
(a− c)
2 ,
(a− c)
2 , b, b)).
(41)
and the lower bound follows. It is enough to
place an upper bound on the key of the partially
transposed state. We observe first that the ρΓ
(where Γ = I ⊗ T is partial transposition) is a
state, since ρ ∈ PPT . Next, ρΓ can be expressed
as a convex combination of two states 2aσ+2bρ′
where σ = 1/2a(|00〉〈00| ⊗A1 + |11〉〈11| ⊗A2) ∈
SEP . Then KD(ρΓ) ≤ ER(ρΓ) ≤ 2bER(ρ′)
where we used the fact that the relative entropy
of entanglement upper boundsKD [18, 19], that
it is convex, and that zero for separable states. It
is then sufficient to note that ER(ρ′) ≤ 1. This
follows from the fact, that the relative entropy
is non-lockable [49]. It is enough to apply (at
random) one of two unitary transformations - I
and σz to perform von-Neumann measurement
on the AB subsystem of ρABA′B′ . This opera-
tion turns the state into ρ′′ of the form
A1 0 0 0
0 B1 0 0
0 0 B2 0
0 0 0 A2
 , (42)
which is by assumption separable. The non-
locability property of Er assures than (see the-
orem 3 of [18]), that this measure does not drop
down under a von-Neumann measurement by
more than the entropy of the random variable
that samples unitary transformations in the pro-
cess of this measurement. It was enough to
sample uniformly at random from two unitary
transformations to turn the state into a one that
has Er(ρ′′) = 0, hence the relative entropy of ρ
could not be larger than h(12) = 1.
To see that KD(ρ) > KD(ρΓ), one observes
that form the normalization condition 2a+ 2b =
14
1, the condition 1 − H(a − c, a + c, b, b) > 2b
reads equivalently form given in Equation (38).
The final argument follows then from the main
theorem.
The sufficient condition given in Equa-
tion (38) can be further expressed with 2 param-
eters only, utilizing the normalization condition
2a + 2b = 1. We therefore express c = αa with
α ∈ [0, 1] and b = (1 − 2a)/2 obtaining equiva-
lent condition as a function of α and a:
H((1+α)a, (1−α)a, (1−2a)/2, (1−2a)/2) < 2a
(43)
The allowed region of parameters (α, a) that sat-
isfy the above condition is presented in Figure 8
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FIG. 8: The shaded region is the set of pairs
(α, a) ∈ [0, 1] × [0.415, 0.5] leading to the gap be-
tween the device-independent keyKDI and the device-
dependent one KD, for states of the form of Equa-
tion (37), according to parametrization c = αa and
b = (1− 2a)/2.
Examples. We focus on PPT states consid-
ered in [31] (obtained in [28]). They are 2ds×2ds
dimensional states of the form:
ρp = (1− p)γ1 + pσ (44)
where γ1 is certain private state while
σ = 12(|01〉〈01| ⊗
√
Y Y † + |10〉〈10| ⊗
√
Y †Y )
= 12(|01〉〈01| ⊗ Y1 + |10〉〈10| ⊗ Y2)
is a separable state for certain Y of trace norm
1, Y1 =
√
Y Y †, Y2 =
√
Y †Y , and p =
1√
ds+1
. It is easy to see that the state is still
PPT, and a structure of a private state mixed
with a separable state, when p is replaced with
pn = (p/2)
n
2(((1−p)/2)n+(p/2)n) , and the correspond-
ing blocks of γ1 and that of σ gets tensored n
times. After certain number of iterations n, that
correspond to recurrence protocol applied to
the key part of Equation (44) [19] the state be-
comes one-way key distillable having postive
rate of the Devetak-Winter protocol [48] equal
to: 1−H({1−2pn, pn, pn}), whereH is the Shan-
non entropy. Indeed the eigenvalues of the pri-
vacy squeezed state of the matrix given in Equa-
tion (45) are {a+c, a−c, b, b}with a = (1−2pn)2 =
c and b = pn with n ≥ 1. More precisely, will
then consider the following class of states ρn of
the form:
(
1−p
2 X1
)⊗n
0 0
(
1−p
2 X
)⊗n
0
(p
2Y1
)⊗n 0 0
0 0
(p
2Y2
)⊗n 0(
1−p
2 X
†
)⊗n
0 0
(
1−p
2 X2
)⊗n

(45)
normalized by a multiplicative factor
1/Nn = 1/2(((1 − p)/2)n + (p/2)n), where
X = 1/(ds
√
ds)
∑ds−1
i,j=0 uij |ij〉〈ji|, X1 =
√
XX†,
X2 =
√
X†X , with uij being (in general
complex) numbers of modulus 1√
ds
so that
U = ∑ij uij |i〉〈j| is a unitary matrix. For
specificity of this example one can take U to
be (tensor power of) a Hadamard matrix[50].
The above class of states where found by Lukas
Pankowski via the genetical algorithms as
a mid-step to the findings of [28], and were
described in [44] and first used in [31].
Now, aiming at constructing as low-
dimensional state exhibiting a gap, as it is
possible by the above construction, we focus on
ds = 2. We can see now, that for m = 3 i.e. the
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state ρm having in total 8 qubits (2 for key part
and 6 for the shield) there is KD(ρ3) ≥ 0.925284,
while KD(ρΓ3 ) ≤ 0.00396825. Hence we have
the desired gap. It is also easy to see that
the separation is true for all m ≥ 3 achieving
KD(ρm) ≈ 1 andKD(ρΓm) ≈ 0 already form = 4.
We have thus explicitly shown an 8 qubit state,
which proves the separation between the
device-dependent and the device-independent
key.
